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LEGAL MALP1RACTCE DAMAGES HN A
TRHAL W HI1IN A TJfAL - A CRHTHCAL
ANALYSS GIF UNEQUE CONCEPTS:
ARaEAS OF UNCDNSCHONABHLHTY
JOSEPH H. KOFFLER*
Where it is established that wrongful conduct has been committed by an
attorney against a client, courts must provide credible criteria and proce-
dures for establishing and calculating damages. If less than this is done,
fundamental fairness to the client is sacrificed, the legal profession's con-
duct towards those whose trust it elicits and accepts becomes unconsciona-
ble, and the credibility of the legal system is seriously undermined.
This Article deals with damages in legal malpractice actions where an
attorney has engaged in wrongful conduct in litigating a controversy, in-
cluding wrongful failure to commence an action, or wrongfully allowing
entry of a default judgment. Problems that arise with respect to the deter-
mination of damages in these legal malpractice actions are complex and an
effort is made to explain and analyze these complexities. This Article artic-
ulates and examines differing jurisdictional views, their strengths and weak-
nesses, and the author's recommended solutions, which focus on the
objective of fundamental fairness.
It must be stated at the outset that in some measure courts have allowed
themselves to drift into solutions that in the view of the author fail the test
of fundamental fairness. The term "drift" is used with measured regard for
the author's belief that these results may have been the product of courts
routinely, or without adequate depth of analysis, dealing with unique
problems which they have perceived to be considerably less challenging
than they actually are. In some instances, this lack of perception, and in-
deed lack of vigilance, has created a serious morass which courts have failed
to recognize.
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Harvard Law School. The author acknowledges the excellent work of Harry Zirlin, Mary Cato,
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assistance in the preparation of this Article. The author also acknowledges the fine and willing
cooperation of Leslie Kanocz and the other members of the library staff and the faculty secretaries
at New York Law School in providing assistance in the preparation of this Article.
LEGAL MALPRACTICE DAMAGES
I. PROBLEMS GENERATED BY THE UNIQUE NATURE OF THE TRIAL
WITHIN A TRIAL
In a legal malpractice action, where a client alleges damage resulting
from an attorney's failure to properly prosecute or defend an action, the
client may be required to prove that he or she would have been successful in
prosecuting or defending the underlying action, if not for the attorney's
negligence or other improper conduct.1 This has resulted in placing the
burden upon the client in a legal malpractice action to prove a "case within
a case," 2 and as it has been described, participate in a "trial within a trial."3
The "trial within a trial" is not consistent with common law principles
as it is not an adversarial proceeding between the real parties in interest in
the underlying action.4 The defendant is the attorney, rather than the per-
son who would have been the defendant in the underlying action. Further-
more, witnesses and records may be difficult to obtain or unavailable and
memories may have faded by the time the legal malpractice action is tried.'
Legal malpractice actions are frequently predicated upon an attorney's fail-
ure to commence an underlying action within the time prescribed by the
statute of limitations,6 making difficulties such as these, because of long
lapses in time, significant probabilities. Similar problems exist where the
plaintiff in the legal malpractice action was the defendant in the underlying
action and is required to establish that there was a meritorious defense to
the underlying action.7
1. See, e.g., Williams v. Bashman, 457 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Sitton v. Clements, 257
F. Supp. 63 (E.D. Tenn. 1966), aff'd, 385 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1967); Duke & Co. v. Anderson, 275
Pa. Super. 65, 418 A.2d 613 (1980); Sherry v. Diercks, 29 Wash. App. 433, 628 P.2d 1336 (1981).
2. See, e.g., Ferencz v. Milie, 517 Pa. 141, 145, 535 A.2d 59, 62 (1987).
3. See, e.g., Hoppe v. Ranzini, 158 N.J. Super. 158, 165, 385 A.2d 913, 917 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1978).
4. See, ag., Fuschetti v. Bierman, 128 N.J. Super. 290, 295, 319 A.2d 781, 784 (Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1974) ("[attorney] defend[s] himself as to his own neglect and stand[s] in the shoes of
the personal injury defendants as to their neglect"). For a general discussion of common law
principles, see J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, COMMON LAW PLEADING (1969).
5. See Gautam v. DeLuca, 215 N.J. Super. 388, 398, 521 A.2d 1343, 1348 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1987) ("it is often difficult for the parties to present an accurate evidential reflection or sem-
blance of the original action").
6. See Koffier, Legal Malpractice Statutes of Limitations: A Critical Analysis of a Burgeoning
Crisis, 20 AKRON L. REV. 209 (1986), reprinted in 36 DEF. L.J. 405 (1987).
7. See Anderson v. Griffin, Dysart, Taylor, Penner & Lay, P.C., 684 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984) (client did not become aware of default judgment until six years after it had been




Among the diverse questions upon which there may arise jurisdictional
differences, policy considerations, and analytical difficulties, are the
following:
1. In a legal malpractice action, is the appropriate question how the
underlying action "should have been" decided, or how it "would have
been" decided?8 May the results differ, depending upon which concept is
used, and are they both manageable concepts?9
2. Is causation established by the use of proximate cause, substantial
cause, or another concept, and is forseeability required?1"
3. In a legal malpractice action, who makes determinations on ques-
tions of law and questions of fact that arose in the underlying action? i"
4. In a legal malpractice action, what factors should be considered in
determining how a jury would have decided the underlying action?' 2
5. In a legal malpractice action, what criteria should be used to deter-
mine the credibility of witnesses testifying with respect to the underlying
action? 13
6. Does a client who was or would have been the plaintiff in the under-
lying action have the burden of proving that he or she would have been
successful in the underlying action, or does the attorney have the burden of
proving that the client would have been unsuccessful? 4
7. Where the client was the defendant in the underlying action, does
the client have the burden of proving that he or she would have been suc-
cessful in the underlying action, or does the attorney have the burden of
proving that the client would have been unsuccessful? 5
8. Where the client was or would have been the plaintiff in the under-
lying action, is it necessary to establish that the defendant, or the prospec-
tive defendant, in the underlying action, was solvent? 16
9. Must it be established in a legal malpractice action that if a judg-
ment had been obtained awarding damages to the client in the underlying
action, it would have been collectible?' 7 If so, collectible at what time? 8
8. See infra Sections II A 1 and II A 3.
9. See infra Section II A 3.
10. See infra Section IV A.
11. See infra Section II A 3.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See infra Sections II A 1 and IV B and C.
15. See infra Section IV B and C.
16. See infra Section II B 1.
17. See infra Section II B 1 and 2.
18. See infra Section II B 2.
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Questions such as these will be considered and analyzed in this Article,
with a view toward establishing the parameters of existing requirements in
various jurisdictions, and recommending approaches to maximize funda-
mental fairness.
II. FAILURE TO PROPERLY REPRESENT CLIENT IN PURSUING A
CAUSE OF ACTION
A. Value of the Underlying Action
1. A "Would Have" and "Should Have" Dichotomy
The court in Williams v. Bashman19 states that "[t]he orthodox view,
and indeed virtually the universal one, is that when a plaintiff alleges that
the defendant lawyer negligently provided services to him or her as a plain-
tiff in the underlying action,"20 the plaintiff, in order to recover damages in
the malpractice action, "must establish by the preponderance of the evi-
dence that he or she would have recovered a judgment in the underlying
action,"21 and the damages in the malpractice action "are measured by the
lost judgment."22 In describing this view as "virtually the universal one,"23
the Williams court is in error, because this view does not allow for possible
additions to or subtractions from the amount of the lost judgment and there
is significant authority requiring that this be done.24
19. 457 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
20. Id. at 326.
21. Id.; see also McDow v. Dixon, 138 Ga. App. 338, 339, 226 S.E.2d 145, 147 (1976) (client
suing attorney for malpractice "must prove that his claim was valid and would have resulted in a
judgment in his favor"); Taylor Oil Co. v. Weisensee, 334 N.W.2d 27, 29 (S.D. 1983).
22. Williams, 457 F. Supp. at 326.
23. Id.
24. The following cases, some of which involve a "trial within a trial," include legal malprac-
tice actions and other actions growing out of the attorney-client relationship. These cases con-
sider or discuss additions, subtractions or awards that are taken into account in arriving at a
judgment, based on factors indicated in the text below. The author submits that there is no ade-
quate basis for not including such additions, subtractions or awards with the amount of the lost
judgment in arriving at a judgment in a legal malpractice action where the case involves a "trial
within a trial" if they would have been allowed in a legal malpractice action not involving a "trial
within a trial."
Personal injury, including mental and emotional distress. See, e.g., Singleton v. Foreman, 435
F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1970); Quezada v. Hart, 67 Cal. App. 3d 754, 761, 136 Cal. Rptr. 815, 819
(1977) (court considered California Civil Code § 3333 and concluded that "California courts have
limited emotional suffering damages to cases involving either physical impact and injury to plain-
tiff or intentional wrongdoing by defendant"); McClain v. Faraone, 369 A.2d 1090, 1094 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1977) (court observed that breach of duty, which is basis of plaintiff's claim, does not
involve wilful or wanton conduct of defendant and that "in an action based upon contract, unac-
companied by a related affirmative tortious physical act and unaccompanied by physical injury,
mental suffering is not an element to be considered in awarding compensatory damages. Restate-
1989]
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ment of Contracts § 341 ...."); Carroll v. Rountree, 34 N.C. App. 167, 237 S.E.2d 566, aff'd, 36
N.C. App. 156, 243 S.E.2d 821 (1977), McEvoy v. Helikson, 277 Or. 781, 562 P.2d 540 (1977).
Damage to reputation. See, e.g., Kirtland and Packard v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. App. 3d 140,
131 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1976); McClain, 369 A.2d at 1094 (refused to grant loss of reputation dam-
ages, apparently because breach of duty which was basis of plaintiff's claim did "not involve wilful
or wanton conduct of defendant"); Hill v. Montgomery, 184 Ill. 220, 56 N.E. 320 (1900).
Attorney's fees, including contingent fees. See, e.g., Sitton v. Clements, 385 F.2d 869, 870 (6th
Cir. 1967) (affirming district court's ruling that defendant attorney would have been entitled to
50% of the potential recovery in suit he failed to bring and therefore plaintiff in the legal malprac-
tice action was "only entitled to half of the probable recovery" in the underlying action); Duncan
v. Lord, 409 F. Supp. 687 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Kane, Kane & Kritzer, Inc. v. Altagen, 107 Cal. App.
3d 36, 165 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1980) (contingent fee attorney would have been entitled to in an under-
lying action cannot be subtracted from the award in a legal malpractice action); Christy v. Sal-
iterman, 288 Minn. 144, 179 N.W.2d 288 (1970) (issue not properly raised by defendant attorney);
Andrews v. Cain, 62 A.D.2d 612, 406 N.Y.S.2d 168 (App. Div. 1978); Childs v. Comstock, 69
A.D. 160, 74 N.Y.S. 643 (App. Div. 1902).
Attorney's fees for alternate counsel. A client may be required to pay attorney's fees to carry
out or complete a matter entrusted to the defendant attorney, to bring an action against a third
person, or to defend an action brought against the client as a result of the attorney's alleged
negligence. See, e.g., Coon v. Ginsberg, 32 Colo. App. 206, 509 P.2d 1293 (1973) (alternate coun-
sel); Hill v. Okay Constr. Co., 312 Minn. 324, 252 N.W.2d 107 (1977) (payment to counsel to
defend action brought against client as result of attorney's alleged wrongful conduct); Central
Trust Co. v. Goldman, 70 A.D.2d 767, 417 N.Y.S.2d 359 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 47
N.Y.2d 1008, 394 N.E.2d 290, 420 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1979); Hiss v. Friedberg, 201 Va. 572, 112
S.E.2d 871 (1960) (payment to counsel to bring action against a third person).
Attorney's fees for prosecuting legal malpractice action. See, e.g., Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 393 So. 2d 851, 859 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (but court, in what may be an effort to
disguise the basis for its action, asserts that "[the award of this item of loss or damage [$5000, the
amount which client had agreed to pay his attorney in the legal malpractice action] does not
amount to an award of attorney fees incurred in order to pursue the malpractice action as such,"
but is to compensate for a different cost incurred by client), aff'd, 422 So. 2d 1109 (La. 1982);
Widemshek v. Fale, 17 Wis. 2d 337, 342, 117 N.W.2d 275, 277 (1962) (court found client had not
been damaged by alleged negligence or fraud and denied client any recovery, stating that "the law
does not generally recognize attorney's fees as recoverable unless authorized by statute or con-
tract, except when natural and proximate result of wrongful act by defendant has involved plain-
tiff with litigation with other parties").
Advances for expenses. See, e.g., Welder v. Mercer, 247 Ark. 999, 448 S.W.2d 952 (1970)
(attorney who failed to file transcript was liable for client's advancement for processing appeal);
Kilmer v. Carter, 274 Cal. App. 2d 81, 88, 78 Cal. Rptr. 800, 805 (1969) (in affirming trial court's
refusal to award client cost of transcripts and filing fees expended in connection with appeal, court
concludes client would have lost appeal, in which event he would not have been reimbursed for
costs and therefore, "they are not a proximate result of defendants' negligence").
Interest. See, e.g., Jackson v. Clopton, 66 Ala. 29, 34 (1880) ("It does not appear that this
[delay and consequent loss of interest] was attributable to any negligence on the part of the attor-
neys - to say nothing of the remote and speculative nature of a claim for damages based on such
a contingency."); Slayton-Paltrow, Inc. v. Niles, 60 A.D.2d 912, 401 N.Y.S.2d 568 (App. Div.
1978); In re Remsen, 99 Misc. 2d 92, 415 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1979).
Punitive or exemplary damages. See, e.g., Singleton, 435 F.2d at 971 (If contract breach also
amounts to an independent tort and "is accompanied by some intentional wrong, insult, abuse,
gross negligence, or oppression, the claim for exemplary damages is properly asserted." Also,
where malice may be imputed from attorney's conduct, punitive damages are justified.); Bangert
v. Harris, 553 F. Supp. 235 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (court dismissed claims for punitive damages on
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Establishing the value of the underlying action may require a "trial
within a trial."'25 This is directed at determining whether the client would
have or should have prevailed in the underlying action if not for the negli-
counts based on breach of contract, but denied defendant's motions to dismiss exemplary damages
claims in count alleging "intentional legal malpractice" and in count alleging "vindictive and
intentional infliction of mental distress"); Welder, 247 Ark. 999, 448 S.W.2d 952 (rejects gross
negligence as basis for punitive damages award, and indicates that it would require showing in
nature of intentional wrong or conscious indifference); Kluge v. O'Gara, 227 Cal. App. 2d 207,
210, 38 Cal. Rptr. 607, 609 (1964) ("This established absence of actual damages removes all basis
for award of exemplary damages.").
Settlement and payments by tortfeasors and insurance carriers. See, eg., Smiley v. Manchester
Ins. & Indem. Co., 71111. 2d 306, 311, 375 N.E.2d 118, 121 (1978) ("bad faith refusal to settle case
within policy limits" resulted in attorney's liability); Katzenberger v. Bryan, 206 Va. 78, 141
S.E.2d 671 (1965); Gustavson v. O'Brien, 87 Wis. 2d 193, 201-02, 274 N.W.2d 627, 631-32 (1979)
(Attorney's negligence "forced the client to litigate an arguably meritorious issue and a fair settle-
ment was reached, not hastily, but after extensive negotiations." Therefore, public policy "should
not preclude the client from proceeding against the lawyer for any deficiency that can be definitely
established.").
Contributory negligence, comparative negligence, and assumption of risk. There is authority to
the effect that contributory negligence of the client, pursuant to common law doctrine, is a com-
plete bar to recovery in a legal malpractice action. See, e.g., Ott v. Smith, 413 So. 2d 1129, 1134-
35 (Ala. 1982); Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975); Gustavson, 87
Wis. 2d 193, 274 N.W.2d 627 (client's negligence is an affirmative defense and is waived if not
pleaded).
Where a jurisdiction has adopted a comparative negligence doctrine by case law or statute, and
if the comparative negligence doctrine is deemed applicable in legal malpractice actions, contribu-
tory negligence may merely reduce recovery. See, e.g., Cicorelli v. Capobianco, 89 A.D.2d 842,
453 N.Y.S.2d 21 (App. Div. 1982), aff'd, 59 N.Y.2d 626, 449 N.E.2d 1273, 463 N.Y.S.2d 195
(1983) (Jury found clients were 35% responsible for their loss. Court vacated this finding, point-
ing out that in light of the attorney's erroneous advice it would be improper to hold clients respon-
sible for failing to apply for rezoning and for failing to pay taxes on property, but nowhere
indicates that the comparative negligence doctrine is inapplicable in an appropriate case.); Tit-
sworth v. Mondo, 95 Misc. 2d 233, 243, 407 N.Y.S.2d 793, 798 (Sup. Ct. 1978) ("Contributory
negligence will, here as elsewhere, affect recovery. [citations omitted]. However, as of September
1, 1975, contributory negligence would no longer bar recovery but, rather, reduce damages to the
extent of the culpable conduct. (CPLR Art. 14-A).").
Assumption of risk, which is generally a complete bar to recovery at common law in negli-
gence actions, may merely reduce recovery in some comparative negligence jurisdictions. On the
question of whether assumption of risk may be validly interposed in a legal malpractice action, see
Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555 (D.C. 1979) (a medical malpractice action from which
the rationale for application of the defense of assumption of risk to legal malpractice actions may
be extrapolated).
Mitigation of damages. See, e.g., Lewis v. Superior Ct., 77 Cal. App. 3d 844, 853, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 6 (1978) (defendant attorney "is not required to compensate for damages avoidable by
reasonable effort"); Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1961); Ninth
Ave. & Forty-Second St. Corp. v. Zimmerman, 217 A.D. 498, 500, 217 N.Y.S. 123, 125 (App.
Div. 1926) (client "is under an obligatory duty to make reasonable effort to minimize the dam-
ages"); Gustavson, 87 Wis. 2d at 201, 274 N.W.2d at 631 ("The settlement was a bona fide attempt
by [clients] to mitigate their damages and bring the litigation to an end.").
25. See, e.g., Fuschetti v. Bierman, 128 N.J. Super. 290, 295-96, 319 A.2d 781, 784 (Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1974). This may also be referred to as a "suit within a suit," see, e.g., Lieberman v.
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gence or other improper conduct of the attorney. If the conclusion is that
the client would have or should have prevailed in the underlying action, the
court then determines the amount of the judgment the client would have
recovered, and makes a determination as to whether such a judgment would
have been collectible, in whole or in part.26 However, there is support for
the principle that the "suit within a suit" concept has vitality in only a
limited number of situations, as where an attorney's negligence prevents a
client from bringing an action, for example, where the attorney allows the
statute of limitations to run, or where the attorney's failure to appear causes
judgment to be entered against the client, or where the attorney's negligence
prevents an appeal from being perfected.27
While courts frequently state the issue in the legal malpractice action as
being whether the client "would have"2 prevailed in the underlying action,
in Lewandowski v. Continental Casualty Co.29 the court states that "the ulti-
mate goal should be to determine what the outcome should have been if the
issue had been properly presented in the first instance."'3 ° A cautionary
note must be struck, however, when considering this language because, at
another point, Lewandowski states that in Sitton v. Clements31 "the court
applied what might be termed the 'what would have happened' theory."' 32
To lend additional confusion, Lewandowski quotes Sitton as stating that the
burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show that "if suit had been instituted
he could have recovered a judgment from the defendant, the amount of such
judgment, and that defendant was solvent.",33 Nothing has been found to
indicate that Lewandowski, in using the word "should," intended to provide
a substantially different test from "would," but the author suggests that the
difference in these formulations could have important ramifications, as is set
out in the subsequent discussion.34
Employers Ins. of Wausau, 84 N.J. 325, 342, 419 A.2d 417, 426 (1980), or as a "case within a
case," see, e.g., Ferencz v. Milie, 517 Pa. 141, 145, 535 A.2d 59, 62 (1987).
26. On the requirement of establishing the collectibility of a judgment, see infra Sections II B
and IV C.
27. Basic Food Indus. v. Grant, 107 Mich. App. 685, 693, 310 N.W.2d 26, 30 (1981).
28. Williams, 457 F. Supp. at 326; Christy, 288 Minn. at 150, 179 N.W.2d at 294; Hoppe v.
Ranzini, 158 N.J. Super. 158, 165, 385 A.2d 913, 917 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
29. 88 Wis. 2d 271, 276 N.W.2d 284 (1979).
30. Id. at 281, 276 N.W.2d at 289 (emphasis in original).
31. 257 F. Supp. 63 (E.D. Tenn. 1966), aff'd, 385 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1967).
32. Lewandowski, 88 Wis. 2d at 280, 276 N.W.2d at 288 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 281, 276 N.W.2d at 289 (quoting Sitton, 257 F. Supp. at 67) (emphasis added).
34. See infra Section II A 3.
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2. "Trial Within A Trial" and "Alternatives"
The finder of fact in the legal malpractice action is asked to determine
whether the plaintiff would have prevailed, or should have prevailed, in the
underlying action, based upon evidence and testimony presented at the trial
of the legal malpractice action. Witnesses who presumably would have tes-
tified at a trial of the underlying action may testify in the legal malpractice
action."5 Lewandowski can be construed to indicate that the availability of
witnesses is a factor to be considered in determining whether there is to be a
"trial within a trial" to determine damages, or whether some other method-
ology for determining damages is to be used.36 But, the Lewandowski opin-
ion gives no insight as to what other methodology might be available. Some
insight may be gleaned, however, from Gautam v. DeLuca, 7 where the
court points out that the New Jersey Supreme Court had earlier "eschewed
rigid application of the 'suit within a suit' principle in favor of a more flexi-
ble rule."38 It had declined to "'delineate in final detail what alternatives
must be considered,' ",3 but had observed that "'they include the 'suit
within a suit' approach or any reasonable modification thereof.' ""
Gautam appears to imply that a legal malpractice action might proceed
without a "suit within a suit" where the action involves the recovery of
damages for emotional distress, or the award of punitive damages.41 The
court observes that "it is often difficult for the parties to present an accurate
evidential reflection or semblance of the original action,"'42 and that "the
passage of time itself can be a significant factor militating against the 'suit
within a suit' approach. '4
3
If there is no damage to the client in the nature of emotional distress,
and the client is not entitled to punitive damages, the "suit within a suit"
may be the only available refuge for the client seeking an award of damages
in a legal malpractice action based upon alleged misconduct of an attorney
in litigating an action. Furthermore, damages for emotional distress and
punitive damages may be available in legal malpractice actions grounded on
the improper conduct of an attorney unrelated to improper conduct of liti-
35. Lewandowski, 88 Wis. 2d at 282, 276 N.W.2d at 289.
36. Id. at 281-82, 276 N.W.2d at 289.
37. 215 N.J. Super. 388, 521 A.2d 1343 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
38. Id. at 398, 521 A.2d at 1348 (citing Lieberman, 84 N.J. at 343, 419 A.2d at 427).
39. Id. (quoting Lieberman, 84 N.J. at 343, 419 A.2d at 427).
40. Id. (quoting Lieberman, 84 N.J. at 343-44, 419 A.2d at 427).
41. Id. at 390-91, 397-401, 521 A.2d at 1344, 1347-49 (although the court found that neither
an award of damages for emotional distress nor punitive damages was warranted in this case).




gation, where a "suit within a suit" would not in any event be available.'
It is inaccurate to conclude that an alternative to a "suit within a suit" is
required where damages for emotional distress or punitive damages are
sought in a legal malpractice action grounded on negligence in litigating a
controversy. Where a plaintiff has been damaged by loss of a judgment in
the underlying action, certainly the plaintiff should be allowed to establish
this damage through the device of a "suit within a suit," and also be
awarded, where appropriate in the factual context, additional damages
which may include damages to compensate for emotional distress and puni-
tive damages. a5
3. Evaluating the Evidence46 - Credibility of Witnesses
Where there is a "trial within a trial," is the trier of fact in the legal
malpractice action to decide simply what it considers to be the weight of
44. See McEvoy, 277 Or. at 789, 562 P.2d at 544 (under terms of divorce decree, plaintiff had
legal right to custody of his child, and "[i]t follows.., that conduct by defendant which resulted
in an infringement of that legal right, if established by evidence on trial, would entitle plaintiff to
recover damages for 'anguish and mental [suffering] due to the loss of his minor child,' as alleged
in the complaint"). In Singleton, 435 F.2d 962, a client sued her discharged attorney to recover
items given as security under a contingent fee agreement and to recover for alleged eiotional
distress the client suffered because of the attorney's conduct following his discharge after the
attorney refused to permit the client to settle a divorce action. In an unusual complaint, the client
alleged that she was entitled to exemplary damages because "defendant should be taught that
when individuals approach him for aid and services, as plaintiff did, much as one would approach
a priest or minister, he should not be allowed to conduct himself in the manner in which he has
toward the plaintiff .... Id. at 967. The court, in reversing dismissal on the pleadings, states
that "[i]f the breach is accompanied by some intentional wrong, insult, abuse, gross negligence, or
oppression, the claim for exemplary damages is properly asserted." Id. at 971.
45. See cases cited supra note 24. Although the cases cited therein which relate to damages
for emotional distress and punitive damages do not involve a "suit within a suit" or a "trial within
a trial," cases cited in various other categories do allow damages as additions to the amount of a
lost judgment.
46. Issues arise in a "trial within a trial" in a legal malpractice action as to who should make
determinations on questions of fact and questions of law that arose in an underlying action. With
respect to questions of fact, these determinations should be made by the jury, or other trier of fact
in the legal malpractice action. Thus, in Chocktoot v. Smith, 280 Or. 567, 575, 571 P.2d 1255,
1259 (1977), the court states that "[i]n the present case, the trial court, placing itself in the
position of Judge Sisemore in the earlier proceeding, concluded that proper presentation of all
available evidence would have led to a decision in favor of Wesley Wendell Brown, either at trial
or, if not there, then on de novo review on appeal." The court added that this "conclusion is one
of fact from the evidence and should have been left to the jury, unless the court thought that it was
beyond reasonable dispute to the point of justifying a directed verdict on the issue of causation as
well as negligence." Id. at 575-76, 571 P.2d at 1259.
With respect to questions of law, these determinations should be made by the court in the legal
malpractice action. Thus, the Chocktoot court concludes that a determination of whether a
directed verdict was justified in an underlying action is a question of law for the trial court in the
legal malpractice action. In Martin v. Hall, 20 Cal. App. 3d 414, 97 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1971), the
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proffered evidence in establishing the client's underlying cause of action and
damages or is the trier of fact in the legal malpractice action to decide what
weight, in its view, the trier of fact at the trial of the underlying action
would have, or should have, given to this evidence?
Hypothesize a situation where parties of different ethnic origins would
have been plaintiff and defendant in the underlying action, and the venue
would have been in an area strongly weighted, ethnically, in the direction of
one of the parties. Should this be considered by the trier of fact in the legal
malpractice action in determining what the result in the underlying action
would have, or should have, been? It is suggested that the result reached by
the trier of fact in the legal malpractice action might be affected, if ethnicity
is considered, where the question is what "would have" been the result in
the underlying action, but presumably would not be affected if the question
is what "should have" been the result in the underlying action. Therefore,
the formulation of this issue in terms of "would have" or "should have"
may be critical to the result in a legal malpractice action.
Consider the question of credibility of witnesses. Is this to be decided
by the trier of fact in the legal malpractice action in terms of how this trier
of fact appraises a witness' credibility or is the trier of fact in the legal
malpractice action to be called upon to determine how the trier of fact in
the underlying action would have appraised the credibility of a witness? Is
this latter proposition so absurd and impossible to accomplish that it should
be summarily dismissed? Perhaps viscerally, but not in the context of a
clearly defined issue, assuming the issue is framed in terms of how the trier
of fact would have found (rather than should have found) in the underlying
action. Does not what would have happened in truth determine whether,
and to what extent, the client was damaged?
To add an additional dimension in terms of complexity, how does one
determine whether the trier of fact in the underlying action would have
been a judge or jury? If it is assumed, rightly or not, that it would have
been a jury, what is the judge's duty if a judge is the trier of fact in the legal
malpractice action? With legal training and judicial experience, the judge
opinion states that "[t]he trial court, in the instant case, therefore should have ruled how the court
in the criminal case would have resolved these legal questions." Id. at 420, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
However, some doubt is raised with respect to this conclusion by the court in Coon, where it states
that "[e]vidence should have been heard in regard to the allegations set out therein, and the jury
should have been instructed that Ginsberg's liability depended upon the Coons establishing (1)
that, had the motion [to vacate the judgment] been prosecuted, the judgment against the Coons
would have been set aside...." Coon, 32 Colo. App. at 210, 509 P.2d at 1295. Whether a motion
to vacate a judgment should in this instance have been considered a question of fact, rather than a
question of law, is open to inquiry.
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may conclude that there is very substantial doubt as to a witness' credibil-
ity, but at the same time conclude that this witness would impress a jury
and would expectably be believed by a jury. Under these circumstances,
what weight should the judge give to the witness' testimony? Impulse could
lead to the answer that the judge should apply his knowledge and under-
standing so as to arrive at the most "truthful" answer.
But, paradoxically, this is not what a resolution of the issue would re-
quire. The question posed - assuming it is what the jury in the underlying
action would have found (rather than what the jury should have found) -
is meaningful in terms of determining whether and to what extent the client
was in fact damaged by the attorney's improper conduct. The logical re-
sponse is therefore that the judge in the legal malpractice action is to decide
how an "unsophisticated" jury would have evaluated the credibility of the
witness, and not how the judge evaluates the credibility of the witness.
Is this philosophically and ethically acceptable? Will this actually be
the modus operandi of a judge hearing the legal malpractice action? The
above issues are raised in the hope that they are sufficiently provocative to
lead to serious thought at this time, rather than wholly relying upon a case
by case development.
B. Collectibility of a Hypothetical Judgment in the Underlying Action
1. Collectibility and Solvency
Schooled in the common law tradition that the collectibility of a judg-
ment is, or should be, irrelevant to the question of whether or not a judg-
ment should be awarded, or its amount,47 it may be difficult to initially
accept the proposition that a finding of non-collectibility of a judgment in
the underlying action should result in the loss of the legal malpractice ac-
tion. But, here again, as the issue is whether the client was damaged, it
follows syllogistically that the client was not damaged if he or she would
have been unable to collect upon a judgment, even if it had been recovered
in the underlying action.
47. In McDow, 138 Ga. App. 338, 226 S.E.2d 145, the issue of solvency was considered in a
legal malpractice action. The court observes that:
The foregoing solvency requirement is an exception to the general rule that wealth has no
relevance to, and is inadmissible in, the trial of a civil suit for damages. This is because a
litigant's financial condition normally has no probative value as to any of the contested
questions, but serves to prejudice jurors as to the general liability of a defendant.
Id. at 340, 226 S.E.2d at 148; see also Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 566, 92 N.E.2d 81, 87 (1950)
(Crampton, J., dissenting) ("the presence or absence of insurance has no bearing upon the ques-
tion of liability but only upon the collectibility of any judgment which may be rendered").
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It is stated in Sitton v. Clements4" that the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff in a legal malpractice action to show that the defendant in the un-
derlying action was "solvent."'49 But is this an appropriate requirement?
Insolvency may be said to exist where liabilities exceed assets.50 If this defi-
nition of insolvency is accepted, it seems clear that in some instances, de-
pending upon the amount of the judgment and surrounding circumstances,
the judgment will be in whole or in part collectible, although the defendant
is insolvent. There should accordingly be no requirement that it be shown
that the defendant in the underlying action was solvent. Sitton does not
define insolvency, and it does indicate that the result reached is grounded
on collectibility,5 1 although by simply halving the award by way of remitti-
tur from $162,500.00 to $81,250.00 on the ground that the award "is sub-
stantially more than plaintiff could have recovered and collected,"52 the
court indicates an almost shotgun approach in arriving at the $81,250.00
figure. In Hoppe v. Ranzini5 3 the court states that evidence of the solvency
of the defendant in the underlying action may be considered, but indicates
that this evidence is to be used as just one of the factors in determining the
amount of the judgment that could have been collected from the defendant
in the underlying action. 4
In Pickens, Barnes & Abernathy v. Heasley,"5 the court states that where
the solvency of the defendant is known beyond question, as in a tort claim
48. 257 F. Supp. 63 (E.D. Tenn. 1966), aff'd, 385 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1967).
49. Id. at 67.
50. See McGinley v. Massey, 71 Md. App. 352, 355, 525 A.2d 1076, 1077 (Ct. Spec. App.
1987); Southern Lumber & Coal. Co. v. M.P. Olson Real Estate and Constr. Co., 229 Neb. 249,
254, 426 N.W.2d 504, 507 (1988); In re Liquidation of United Am. Bank, 743 S.W.2d 911, 916
(Tenn. 1987). In McDow, 138 Ga. App. 338, 339-40, 226 S.E.2d 145, 147, the court rejects this
definition, observing:
Solvency as used herein is not intended to imply a bankruptcy-type standard, but rather is
intended to illustrate the original defendant's ability to pay a judgment, had one been ren-
dered against him....
Thus, the essence of this requirement is that the malpractice plaintiff show that he
could have recovered a judgment in an amount which was collectible.
138 Ga. App. at 339-40, 226 S.E.2d at 147.
51. Sitton, 257 F. Supp. at 67.
52. Id.
53. 158 N.J. Super. 158, 385 A.2d 913 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
54. Id. at 165, 385 A.2d at 917. The court states:
Plaintiff's loss proximately resulting from the attorney's malpractice is deemed to be mea-
sured only by the amount of the judgment that could have been collected against the main
defendant. To that extent evidence of the main defendant's financial status and solvency
may be considered, although it is not entirely clear as to the period of time that should be
taken into account for that purpose.
Id.
55. 328 N.W.2d 524 (Iowa 1983).
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against the state or an insurance claim within policy limits, a court may
hold without other proof that the entire judgment would have been collecti-
ble. But the court adds that if the defendant in the underlying action was
an individual or other entity "whose solvency is not known beyond ques-
tion,"56 the client must introduce "substantial evidence from which a jury
could reasonably find that a prior judgment would have been collectible in
full, or could reasonably find the portion of the judgment which would have
been collectible."'57 However, finding collectibility because the solvency of
the defendant is thought to be known beyond question may prove faulty
because the actual financial condition of the defendant may not conform
with public perception."8 Also, finding collectibility because a claim is
within policy limits may prove faulty because there may be, in certain cir-
cumstances, affirmative defenses to coverage.5 9
Is it sound to require a showing of collectibility? The court in Hoppe
states that requiring proof of collectibility "may effect a change in or depar-
ture from the concept of proximate causation and the measure of damages
in negligence actions generally, including other kinds of attorney malprac-
tice cases and malpractice suits involving other professions."'  This posi-
tion must fail upon analysis. A judgment in the underlying action which
would not have been collectible would generally be of no value to a client.
To predicate an award of damages upon both the requirement that a judg-
ment would have been recovered and that it would have been collectible, in
whole or in part, requires a showing of causation, in this factual context,
that is conceptually no different from that required in negligence cases
generally.61
56. Id. at 526.
57. Id.
58. In Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1963), where the court considered a count in breach of implied warranty, it
states:
However, for the present at least we do not think it necessary so to extend this rule as to
hold liable the manufacturer [defendant Kollsman] of a component part. Adequate protec-
tion is provided for the passengers by casting in liability the airplane manufacturer [Lock-
heed] which put into the market the completed aircraft.
As a matter of fact, however, a number of years later Lockheed skirted the edge of bankruptcy.
See N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
59. There may be viable defenses to coverage in a particular case, and the insurance company,
which could most effectively raise these defenses, is generally not a party to the legal malpractice
action.
60. Hoppe, 158 N.J. Super. at 167, 385 A.2d at 918.
61. See Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 170, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (1920) ("We must be on our
guard, however, against confusing the question of negligence with that of the causal connection
between the negligence and the injury."); P.A. LANDON, POLLOCK's LAW OF TORTS 345 (15th
ed. 1951) ("Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.").
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2. Collectibility at What Time? And a Proffered Solution
If collectibility is required, collectibility at what time? At this point we
enter an area of the law that has developed in a relatively sparse number of
cases and where the answers are indecisive, inconclusive, and in good mea-
sure fail the test of logic.
Standards developed in various decisions indicating the time at which it
must be shown that a judgment in the underlying action would have been
collectible are set out at this point, together with additional standards devel-
oped by the author that have not, to the knowledge of the author, been
advanced by the courts. At each point the author also presents an analysis
of the validity or acceptability of the standards.
First. Collectibility is irrelevant. There should be no requirement
that it be established in a legal malpractice action that a judgment in
the underlying action would have been collectible.
In support of this proposition it may be argued that even if collectibility,
either at the time the hypothetical judgment would have been recovered or
at a subsequent point in time, cannot be proven in the legal malpractice
action, the defendant in the underlying action conceivably could at any fu-
ture time acquire additional assets and be able to satisfy the judgment. It
would therefore be inequitable to deprive a client of a recovery in a legal
malpractice action because of an inability to marshal sufficient proof to es-
tablish that a judgment would have been collectible at the time it would
have been recovered in the underlying action or at some future time.
In opposition to this proposition it may be urged that it would be unfair
to require the defendant attorney in a legal malpractice action to pay dam-
ages to a client when there may be no more than a scintilla of hope that a
judgment in the underlying action would have been collectible. This would
provide an undeserved windfall to the client at the expense of an attorney
who, based upon the proof presented in the legal malpractice action, has
caused no damage to the client.
Second. The question is whether the judgment, had it been obtained,
would have been collectible in whole or in part at the time it would
have been recovered in the underlying action.
In support of this proposition it may be urged that it provides for cer-
tainty and fairness. It provides for certainty because the trier of fact in the
legal malpractice action makes a determination upon the basis of ability to
pay, at a fixed point in time, by the person who would have been the defend-
ant in the underlying action. It provides for fairness in that this relatively
clear-cut issue, when resolved, will establish what, if anything, the client
would have received in satisfaction of the judgment at the time of recovery,
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and therefore it is fair to assess this amount against the attorney in
damages.
It may be urged, on the contrary, that this proposition lacks merit be-
cause a judgment may become collectible for the first time long after it is
recovered. To deprive a client of damages because of uncollectibility at the
time the judgment would have been recovered, could result in a windfall to
the attorney at the expense of the client. If the judgment would have be-
come collectible at a later point in time, within the statutory period for
satisfaction of a judgment, it is unfair to deprive the client of a recovery
against the attorney.
Third. The issue should be framed in terms of whether a judgment
would have been collectible in whole or in part at the date of the
trial of the malpractice action.6 2
In support of this proposition it may be argued that it provides for cer-
tainty because the facts are examined and a determination is made with
respect to a relatively fixed point in time, the date of the trial of the mal-
practice action.
In opposition to this proposition it may be observed that there is no
fixed point in time when the frame of reference is the date of the trial of the
malpractice action because the trial may encompass a substantial period of
time. At a minimum, there should be more focus and definition in fixing a
determinative time.
But this argument assumes some general acceptability of this proposi-
tion, while in fact it is unacceptable. In Hoppe v. Ranzini 6 3 the court, after
stating that some of the cases seem to use the date of the trial of the mal-
practice action, observes that "[w]hether this is a proper time span, in view
of the life of a judgment, is certainly debatable."'  Acceptance of this prop-
osition could deprive the client of legitimate recompense for his or her dam-
62. The court in Hoppe states, "some of the cases seem to use the date of the trial of the
malpractice action." 158 N.J. Super. at 169, 385 A.2d at 919 (citing McDow v. Dixon, 138 Ga.
App. 338, 226 S.E.2d 145 (1976)); Sitton, 257 F. Supp. 63. The author finds no express statement
to this effect in McDow, and the Sitton court, while not affirmatively embracing this proposition,
states:
We believe that it is reasonably clear that all of the $162,500.00 could not have been col-
lected from Fuller if judgment had been obtained before his sentence to jail or immediately
after he was released from jail. The jury could have found from the evidence that some
part of this amount could have been recovered from him. The jury could have also found
that at the rate of his accumulation of property that additional amounts could have been
collected from him from time to time to the date suit was tried, namely, April 5, 1966.
Sitton, 257 F. Supp. at 66.
63. 158 N.J. Super. 158, 385 A.2d 913 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
64. Id. at 169, 385 A.2d at 919.
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ages because no consideration is given to whether the defendant in the
underlying action would have been able to satisfy the judgment after the
date of the trial of the malpractice action.
Fourth. It should be determined whether a judgment would have
been collectible in whole or in part within a reasonable period of
time after the date of trial of the malpractice action, short of the
initial viability period of a judgment in the applicable jurisdiction. 5
It may be urged that because this proposition extends the time for deter-
mining what the defendant's ability to pay would have been to a reasonable
period of time after the date of trial of the malpractice action, it provides for
a more equitable determination of damages than is provided for under the
previously stated propositions.
In opposition, it may be urged that there is no justificiation for this limi-
tation as it interjects the vague and unmanageable concept of a reasonable
period of time after the date of trial. What criteria are to be used to deter-
mine what period is reasonable in this context? Furthermore, why should
there be any such limitation, and why should it ever be short of the viability
period of a judgment that would have been entered in an underlying action?
The analysis of thefifth proposition speaks to this final question.
Fifth. The issue should be whether the judgment would have been
collectible in whole or in part during the number of years set out in
the relevant statute of limitations for enforcing a judgment, measur-
ing from the date upon which a judgment would have been entered
in the underlying action.66
This proposition would require the jury in the legal malpractice action
to determine on the basis of factors such as assets, liabilities, education,
occupation, expectancies, insurance coverage, and other relevant factors,67
65. Hoppe, 158 N.J. Super. at 169, 385 A.2d at 919 ("Perhaps a reasonable period of time
after the date of trial [of the malpractice action], short of the initial 20-year viability period of a
judgment, may be more appropriate.").
66. While the Hoppe court suggests that a view similar to that set out in the fourth proposi-
tion, would be appropriate (see supra note 65), it does take note of the fact that "[i]t is not without
significance that had a judgment been obtained against [a defendant in an underlying action], it
would have been valid for 20 years, and, in an appropriate proceeding, might have been extended
for another 20 years." Hoppe, 158 N.J. Super. at 169, 385 A.2d at 919.
67. Although not espousing the view set out in thefifth proposition, the McDow court states:
[I]t is... proper to allow the introduction of evidence of the original alleged tortfeasor's
worldly circumstances, financial status, assets, insurance coverage, ownership or other in-
terest in real and personal property, etc., to determine the ability of the original alleged
tortfeasor to satisfy, in whole or in part, what has been determined to be the plaintiff's
damages.
138 Ga. App. at 341, 226 S.E.2d at 148.
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the extent to which a judgment against the defendant in the underlying
action would have been collectible during this entire period of time.
In support of this proposition it is observed that this would, to the ex-
tent feasible, place the client in the position in which he or she would have
been, if not for the negligence or other improper conduct of the attorney.
In opposition to this proposition it may be argued that it is difficult to deter-
mine as a matter of fact what will result over such a long period of time,
and therefore the proposition should be rejected.
The author suggests that this argument in opposition to thefifth propo-
sition may be responded to as follows. The first, second, and third proposi-
tions would indeed result in determinations that are less difficult to make.
But the first proposition must be rejected if the issue is to what extent the
client was actually damaged, and the second and third propositions are in-
trinsically inequitable. The fourth and fifth propositions both require fac-
tual determinations that are difficult, if not impossible, to make with
certainty. But the fourth proposition does not deal with the problem as
equitably, or arrive at as logically acceptable a solution as thefifth proposi-
tion which utilizes the relevant statute of limitations period for enforcing a
judgment, measuring from the date a judgment would have been entered in
the underlying action.
Furthermore, tort principles generally, as increasingly developed by the
courts, reject the concept of lack of certainty in determining damages as a
basis for eschewing new frontiers. This is found, for example, in developing
legal principles in the area of recovery for negligence without impact, 6 and
in the limitation upon or removal of traditional non-consensual privileges.6 9
In the area under consideration, the argument that acceptance of the fifth
proposition, or any of the other stated propositions, would result in lack of
certainty in arriving at damages, is not a viable basis for rejecting the propo-
sition.70 Furthermore, the fifth proposition is the most fundamentally
68. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 737, 441 P.2d 912, 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 78
(1968) (allowing mother who allegedly witnessed fatal automobile accident involving child to state
a cause of action for shock which resulted in physical injury, observing that "[tihe possibility that
some fraud will escape detection does not justify an abdication of the judicial responsibility to
award damages for sound claims"); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 242, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731,
219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 38 (1961) (a cause of action is stated when it is alleged that the claimant was
negligently caused to suffer severe emotional and neurological disturbances with residual physical
manifestations, despite argument that "the damages or injuries are somewhat speculative and diffi-
cult to prove").
69. See, e.g., Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 439, 245 N.E.2d 192, 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d
529, 532 (1969) (allowing injured automobile passenger to sue her unemancipated son who was
driver despite "possibility of a collusive and fraudulent suit").
70. See, e.g., Hoppe, 158 N.J. Super. at 169-70, 385 A.2d at 919:
[Vol. 73:40
LEGAL MALPRACTICE DAMAGES
sound and fair basis upon which to make a determination of damages, as it
does all that a court realistically can do to place the client in the position
that he or she would have been in if not for the negligence or other im-
proper conduct of the attorney. Therefore, thefifth proposition is recom-
mended by the author.
III. FAILURE TO PROPERLY REPRESENT THE CLIENT
IN DEFENDING AN ACTION
A. In General
Where a judgment is entered against the client in the underlying action,
in order for the client to prevail in a legal malpractice action, it must be
established that the client would have prevailed in the underlying action,7'
or the client would have achieved a better result in the underlying action,72
if not for negligence or other improper conduct of the attorney. Here, as in
the case where the client was or would have been the plaintiff in the under-
lying action, there may be required, in the legal malpractice action, a "trial
within a trial ' 73 in order to determine whether the result in the underlying
action would have been more favorable to the client, if not for the negli-
gence or other improper conduct of the attorney.74 There is, however, sup-
port for the principle that where the client was the defendant in an
underlying action the "suit within a suit" concept has vitality only in a
limited number of instances, such as where the attorney's failure to appear
causes judgment to be entered against the client 75 or where the attorney's
negligence prevents an appeal from being perfected.76
Frequently, negligence is established by a showing that the attorney al-
lowed a default judgment to be entered against the client in the underlying
action.77 In that case, the principal issue remaining in the legal malpractice
action is whether the client had a meritorious defense to the underlying
The fact that many of the matters going to collectibility of a judgment appear to be specu-
lative in nature is not necessarily a bar to having them considered. Subject to appropriate
proofs and control and instructions by the court, the trier of facts often considers factors in
assessing damages that may be speculative in some degree.
71. Sherry v. Diercks, 29 Wash. App. 433, 438, 628 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Ct. App. 1981).
72. Id.
73. For a discussion of the "trial within a trial," see supra Section II A.
74. Sherry, 29 Wash. App. at 438, 628 P.2d at 1338.
75. Basic Food Indus. v. Grant, 107 Mich. App. 685, 693, 310 N.W.2d 26, 30 (1981).
76. Id.




action.78 In pleading a cause of action where it must be established that
there was a meritorious defense to an underlying action, the client may fail
if the client does not make such an allegation in his or her complaint.79
Thus, where the client-plaintiff alleged that a default judgment was entered
against him because of the attorney's failure to file an answer in an action as
promised, it was held that the client did not state a cause of action because
of the client's failure to allege that a defense to the action existed."0 The
court may also require specificity in this regard. Accordingly, the Oregon
Supreme Court held that a complaint in a legal malpractice action against
an attorney would be dismissed on demurrer where the alleged defense to
the underlying action was accord and satisfaction. The court concluded
that "[t]his allegation [in client-plaintiff's complaint] does not sufficiently
evidence the intent of the parties to presently extinguish and thereby fully
satisfy the pre-existing indebtedness."81
It has been observed that where the client was or would have been the
plaintiff in the underlying action, various problems arise and differences in
result may be achieved, dependent upon whether the court in the legal mal-
practice action adopts the test of what "should have" been the result in the
underlying action, or what "would have" been the result in the underlying
action, if not for the attorney's negligence or other improper conduct.82
The test frequently favored by the courts is what "would have" been the
result in the underlying action.83 However, in the above analysis of cases
where the client was or would have been the plaintiff in the underlying
action, it is observed that Lewandowski v. Continental Casualty Co. 4 makes
reference to the test of what "should have" been the result in the underlying
action. If this test is adopted in cases where the client was the defendant in
the underlying action, in the author's view, different issues will arise from
those that arise where the "would have" test is employed. These issues are
similar to those postulated and previously considered in discussing the
"trial within a trial," where the client was or would have been the plaintiff
78. See, e.g., Central Cab Co. v. Clarke, 259 Md. 542, 270 A.2d 662 (1970); Garguilo v.
Schunk, 58 A.D.2d 683, 395 N.Y.S.2d 751 (App. Div. 1977); Masters v. Dunstan, 256 N.C. 520,
523, 124 S.E.2d 574, 576 (1962); Floyd v. Kosko, 285 S.C. 390, 329 S.E.2d 459 (Ct. App. 1985);
Sherry, 29 Wash. App. 433, 628 P.2d 1336; see also infra note 129.
79. Martin v. Nichols, 110 Wash. 451, 188 P. 519 (1920) (counterclaim in action for legal
services rendered).
80. Id. at 453-54, 188 P. at 520.
81. Harding v. Bell, 265 Or. 202, 210, 508 P.2d 216, 220 (1973).
82. See supra Section II A 3.
83. See supra note 28.
84. 88 Wis. 2d 271, 276 N.W.2d 284 (1979).
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in the underlying action.85 Reference is made to that discussion for an anal-
ysis of issues that may arise where the "should have" and "would have"
tests are adopted, and their impact on the outcome in legal malpractice
actions.86 Furthermore, the previously discussed evidentiary problems that
arise from proceeding within the context of a "trial within a trial" are
equally relevant where the client was the defendant in the underlying
action.87
B. The Prepayment Rule and Statutes of Limitations
and A Proffered Solution
An additional problem arises where the client was the defendant in the
underlying action and has not paid a judgment that was entered against the
client in that action. Under one view, the client may have a cause of action
against the attorney even though the client has not paid this judgment. 8
As justification, it has been reasoned that the judgment is still "hanging
over [the client-plaintiff's] head."89 Under a contrary view, the so-called
"prepayment rule," a legal malpractice action against an attorney will be
dismissed where the client has not paid any part of the judgment in the
underlying action.90 Under the prepayment rule, if the client has paid part,
but not all, of the judgment, the client's recovery against the attorney in the
legal malpractice action would be limited to the amount paid.91
This "prepayment rule" can be severely criticized. There are cases in
which the client is unable to pay the judgment, in which instances the appli-
cation of this rule will result in the client being unable to recover a judgment
against an attorney who has committed malpractice. Consider this together
85. See supra Section II A 3.
86. Id.
87. Id.; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
88. Montfort v. Jeter, 567 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. 1978). The court in Gruse v. Belline, 138 IIl.
App. 3d 689, 486 N.E.2d 398 (App. Ct. 1985), states:
Generally, where an attorney is engaged to defend an action that is lost by his negligence,
the amount of the judgment suffered by the client is a proper element of recovery in a
malpractice proceeding against the attorney .... In the context of a legal malpractice
action, it was held in Montfort v. Jeter (Tex. 1978), 567 S.W.2d 498, that an unpaid judg-
ment against the plaintiff shown to have resulted from his attorney's unauthorized act was
evidence of actual damages even though it remained unpaid at the time of trial.
Id. at 698, 486 N.E.2d at 404 (citation omitted).
89. Montfort, 567 S.W.2d at 499.
90. See Allied Prods., Inc. v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763, 232 S.E.2d 774 (1977).
91. Id. at 766, 232 S.E.2d at 776 ("Accordingly, we hold that when a client has suffered a
judgment for money damages as the proximate result of his lawyer's negligence such judgment
constitutes actual damages recoverable in a suit for legal malpractice only to the extent such
judgment has been paid.").
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with the additional fact that the statute of limitations for enforcing judg-
ments will almost certainly be longer than the statute of limitations for in-
stituting legal malpractice actions.92 In this circumstance, if the client is
unable to pay the judgment in the underlying action and at a later date
acquires assets, the client may be required to pay the judgment (the statute
of limitations for enforcement of judgments not having run) and be without
remedy against the attorney who committed malpractice because the statute
of limitations for legal malpractice has run. This result is unconscionable.
But such a result can be prevented by courts developing a doctrine
which provides that the statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions is
tolled for the period of time during which the judgment in the underlying
action remains unpaid by the client. The author recommends the adoption
of such a doctrine. Numerous other doctrines for tolling the statute of limi-
tations in legal malpractice actions have already been devised and applied
by the courts.93 These doctrines can be justified on the policy consideration
that unconscionability should be prevented, and in particular, and with spe-
cial force, in the attorney-client relationship. This is a sound and adequate
policy basis for adopting a tolling doctrine in the situation under discussion.
C. The Prepayment Rule and Res Judicata
Even if the statute of limitations is not a bar in a particular case, if the
court applies the principle that the attorney will be liable in a legal malprac-
tice action only where the client has paid all or part of the judgment in the
underlying action, the client may be placed in an untenable position. As-
sume the client has been unable to pay any part of the judgment and there-
fore fails in a legal malpractice action he or she institutes against the
attorney. Further assume that the client subsequently obtains assets and
these are seized in satisfaction of the judgment. It may be urged that the
client is barred by resjudicata from maintaining a second legal malpractice
92. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-574 (Supp. 1988) (provides, in part, for a two-year statute of
limitations for all legal service liability actions against a legal service provider, with a discovery
rule which includes a provision that in no event may the action be commenced more than four
years after the act, omission or failure that gives rise to the claim); ALA. CODE § 6-9-192 (1977)
(provides that "[n]o execution shall issue on a judgment of the district or circuit court on which
an execution has not been sued out within 10 years of its entry until the same has been revived by
appropriate motion or action under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure"); ALA. CODE § 6-9-
190 (1977) (provides that a judgment cannot be revived after the lapse of 20 years from its entry);
see also Sitton v. Clements, 257 F. Supp. 63, 66 (E.D. Tenn. 1966) ("Under Tennessee law, a
judgment is good for ten years and may be renewed, if renewed within the ten-year period, for
another ten years, etc."), aff'd, 385 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1967); supra note 66.
93. For a discussion of other doctrines which toll the statute of limitations in legal malprac-
tice actions, see Koffier, supra note 6.
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action against the attorney. If this position is accepted, the bald - and
certainly unconscionable - result would be liability of the client resulting
from the attorney's malpractice, and freedom from liability for the attorney.
It is suggested, however, that if the sole basis for attempting to preclude
recovery by the client is resjudicata, the client may argue as follows: All of
the elements necessary to establish a cause of action for legal malpractice
had not come into existence at the time the client instituted the first legal
malpractice action against the attorney (assuming a jurisdiction in which it
must be established that the client has paid all or part of the judgment in
order to have a cause of action against the attorney, and the client had
made no such payment). As it is necessary that all of the essential elements
of an action come into existence before a cause of action exists,94 no cause
of action existed against the attorney when the first legal malpractice action
was instituted. When the client later satisfied the judgment in the underly-
ing action, a cause of action against the attorney for legal malpractice came
into existence for the first time. The client was therefore litigating, in the
second legal malpractice action, a cause of action that did not exist when
the first action was instituted, and accordingly the doctrine of resjudicata is
not applicable.95
94. See, e.g., Brown v. American Broadcasting Co., 704 F.2d 1296, 1300 (4th Cir. 1983) ("the
statute of limitations cannot begin to run against a claim until all the elements of the cause of
action exist"); Hodge v. Service Mach. Co., 438 F.2d 347, 349 (6th Cir. 1971) ("A suit may not be
brought upon a cause of action until it exists, and a cause of action does not exist until all its
elements coalesce."); McDaniel v. Clarkstown Cent. School Dist., 110 A.D.2d 349, 352, 494
N.Y.S.2d 885, 888 (App. Div. 1985) ("A wrongful death claim... does not come into existence
until all the statutory elements of such a cause of action have been met.").
95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20(2) (1982). According to the
RESTATEMENT:
A valid and final personal judgment for the defendant, which rests on the prematurity of
the action or on the plaintiff's failure to satisfy a precondition to suit, does not bar another
action by the plaintiff instituted after the claim has matured, or the precondition has been
satisfied, unless a second action is precluded by operation of the substantive law.
Id.; see also Green v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 609 F. Supp. 1021, 1024-25 (N.D. Ill. 1985) ("the
doctrine of resjudicata does not stop a plaintiff from bringing a... claim based on acts occurring
after judgment in the first suit"); O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 358, 429 N.E.2d
1158, 1160, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689 (1981) ("the general trespass allegations [against the munici-
pality] - are not barred by resjudicata to the extent that they describe acts occurring after the
1973 lawsuit"); Cone v. City of Lubbock, 395 S.W.2d 651, 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (former
judgment "does not prevent further proceeding where the facts have changed or new facts have
occurred which may alter the legal rights or relations of the litigants").
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IV. CAUSATION AND BURDEN OF PROOF - THE "TRIAL WITHIN A
TRIAL": UNCONSCIONABILITY
A. Causation - Theories and Results
On the issue of causation in legal malpractice actions, courts frequently
state that proximate cause is to be established by applying a "but for" test.
Such a test requires a plaintiff to prove that but for the attorney's negli-
gence, the plaintiff would have prevailed at the trial of the underlying ac-
tion;96 or if an underlying action had been properly defended, a defense to
the underlying action would have been wholly or partially successful;97 or
that but for the attorney's negligence, plaintiff would have prevailed on an
appeal from the underlying action.98
In a Note in the April 1978 issue of the Cornell Law Review,99 the "but
for" test is considered in conjunction with standard of proof and this con-
clusion is reached: "The burden of proof is usually on the plaintiff to prove
causation in fact by a preponderance of the evidence. In legal malpractice
cases, however, courts often combine the 'but for' requirement with a high
standard of proof." 1" If this latter conclusion is correct, it is of great im-
portance, and therefore the authorities and analysis offered in support of
this conclusion have been carefully examined. The author is of the opinion
that the conclusion that courts often combine the "but for" requirement
with a high standard of proof in legal malpractice actions is clearly not
supported by the citations and analysis provided in the Note, for reasons set
out in the footnote appended hereto.101
96. See, eg., Phillips v. Clancy, 152 Ariz. 415, 733 P.2d 300 (Ct. App. 1986); Freeman v.
Rubin, 318 So. 2d 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Colucci v. Rosen, Goldberg, Slavet, Levenson &
Wekstein, P.C., 25 Mass. App. Ct. 107, 515 N.E.2d 891 (1987); Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn.
144, 179 N.W.2d 288 (1970); Hickox v. Holleman, 502 So. 2d 626 (Miss. 1987); Rorrer v. Cooke,
313 N.C. 338, 329 S.E.2d 355 (1985).
97. See, e.g., Fairhaven Textile Corp. v. Sheehan, Phinney, Bass & Green, 695 F. Supp. 71, 75
(D. N.H. 1988); Zych v. Jones, 84 Ill. App. 3d 647, 406 N.E.2d 70 (1980); Central Cab Co. v.
Clarke, 259 Md. 542, 270 A.2d 662 (1970); Garguilo v. Schunk, 58 A.D.2d 683, 395 N.Y.S.2d 751
(App. Div. 1977); Sherry v. Diercks, 29 Wash. App. 433, 438, 628 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1981); see also
infra note 129.
98. See, e.g., Daugert v. Pappas, 104 Wash. 2d 254, 704 P.2d 600 (1985).
99. Note, The Standard of Proof of Causation in Legal Malpractice Cases, 63 CORNELL L.
REV. 666 (1978).
100. Id. at 668.
101. The conclusion reached in the Note is as follows: "The burden of proof is usually on the
plaintiff to prove causation in fact by a preponderance of the evidence. In legal malpractice cases,
however, courts often combine the 'but for' requirement with a high standard of proof." Id.
Reliance is placed upon Coon v. Ginsberg, 32 Colo. App. 206, 509 P.2d 1293 (1973), as one of the
principal authorities in support of this conclusion. The Note states that Coon "required a 'show-
ing with certainty' that the plaintiff had sustained actual damages as a result of the defendant
attorney's negligence." Note, supra note 99, at 668-69 (quoting Coon, 32 Colo. App. at 210, 509
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P.2d at 1295). However, in Coon the court simply observes, in a loosely drawn opinion, that "[b]y
the fundamental rules of damages, however, a wronged litigant cannot recover substantial dam-
ages in the absence of a showing with certainty that actual damages were, in fact, sustained."
Coon, 32 Colo. App. at 210, 509 P.2d at 1295 (citing 25 C.J.S. Damages § 3 (1966)). The court
does not indicate that these rules are applied differently in legal malpractice actions than in other
actions.
In Coon, it is alleged that the defendant attorney, against the express directions of the clients,
stipulated to a judgment against the clients in the underlying action. An issue the court deals with
involves an instruction of the trial court relating to what damage can be the responsibility of the
defendant attorney. The court holds that contrary to the trial court's instruction, the defendant
attorney cannot be held responsible for any lost equity in an airplane that had been sold at public
sale, because the agreement to sell the airplane was made with the assistance of other counsel prior
to defendant attorney's entry into the case. The court also holds that the correct measure of
damages on this issue "is that portion of the amount to which Ginsberg [defendant attorney]
stipulated that exceeds the actual amount to which the bank was entitled from the Coons [clients]
at that time." Coon, 32 Colo. App. at 211, 509 P.2d at 1296. Thus, the court finds error in the
instruction, as indicated, and also finds error in an instruction on an unrelated issue concerning
damages for payments made to alternate counsel. In view of the issues presented and the holding
of the court, Coon offers little support for the conclusion in the Note under discussion.
Better Homes Inc. v. Rogers, 195 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. NV. Va. 1961) is also advanced in support
of the conclusion under consideration, being cited for the principle that "plaintiff must show that
[the] 'result could only have been in its favor.'" Note, supra note 99, at 669 n.20 (quoting Better
Homes, 195 F. Supp. at 95). Better Homes is an action against attorneys for failing to timely file
an appeal from a judgment rendered against their client, the defendant in the underlying action.
The opinion reveals that counsel for the plaintiff client in the legal malpractice action conceded
that plaintiff must show that "it would have been awarded a new trial" on appeal and that plaintiff
must also "satisfy this court that on a new trial the result could only have been in its favor, and no
judgment could properly have been entered against it." Better Homes, 195 F. Supp. at 95. Plain-
tiff's counsel having made this latter concession, the court observed that "[i]n my opinion, this
concession is justified." Id. at 95. The court indicates that if it is found that appellate review is
imperative, then in the posture of this case, the next step "is limited to a search for error so vital
that its correction would necessitate a judgment non obstante veredicto and the entry of a judg-
ment for the defendant.., or a reversal of the case with clear indication to the trial court that a
verdict should be directed for the defendant." Id.
Despite its extreme position, Better Homes does not appear to provide significant authority for
the conclusion that in legal malpractice actions courts often combine the "but for" requirement
with a high standard of proof. Better Homes arises in the factual context of alleged negligence in
failure to appeal, and would not necessarily be applicable in actions based upon alleged negligence
in failure to commence or defend an action, a major source of litigation in this area. It also
includes a concession by counsel on the issue being considered. In addition, the court cites little
authority, as it observes: "I have been surprised at the paucity of authoritative cases in which a
losing defendant charges negligence against his lawyer for failure to take timely appeal. Counsel
has cited none, and my own research has uncovered few." Id. at 96.
The Note also seeks support from Gladden v. Logan, 28 A.D.2d 1116, 1116, 284 N.Y.S.2d
920, 921 (1967), a legal malpractice action grounded in defendant attorneys' failure to prosecute a
negligence action which had been entrusted to them by the plaintiff. The Note indicates that the
court rejected plaintiff's request that plaintiff be required to show that "she probably would re-
cover" rather than that "she would recover" in the underlying action. Note, supra note 99, at 669
n.20.
But in Gladden, a two paragraph per curiam opinion, the court states, "[o]bviously it is impos-
sible to show conclusively that had that action gone to trial it would have resulted in a verdict
favorable to plaintiff. What plaintiff must do is to prove such facts in regard to the accident as
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In Hoppe v. Ranzini, "2 the court states that an attorney is liable for
"that which his negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about. His
negligence need not be the proximate cause of such damages. It suffices if it
is a proximate cause thereof."' 10 3 This is consistent with application, in
legal malpractice actions, of the view expressed in the Restatement of Torts.
The Restatement provides that an "actor's negligent conduct is a legal
enables the jury to find that she would have recovered." Gladden, 28 A.D.2d at 1116, 284
N.Y.S.2d at 921. The court adds that "[w]hether this is called 'that she would recover' or that
'she probably would recover' is merely a matter of phrasing." Id. at 1116, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 921. It
seems fair to conclude that this lends no support to the conclusion that in legal malpractice cases,
courts often combine a "but for" requirement with a high standard of proof.
Reliance is also placed on Weiner v. Moreno, 271 So. 2d 217, 218-19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1973). It is stated in the Note that the court remanded the case "for redetermination of an attor-
ney's liability, even though the plaintiff had conclusively demonstrated that the attorney had been
negligent and that, in the underlying medical malpractice case, two surgical packs had been left in
the patient's body." Note, supra note 99, at 669-70. In Weiner, an individual sustained serious
injuries in an automobile accident, underwent emergency surgery, and died. The widow of the
decedent retained the defendant attorneys to bring a malpractice action against Dade County for
wrongful death. The claim was filed, but was dismissed for want of prosecution after the statute of
limitations had run. Weiner merely concludes that it had not been successfully proven by plaintiff
in the legal malpractice action that the negligence of the defendant attorneys "resulted in and was
the proximate cause of the loss to the client" because "the jury in the trial for damages, due to the
trial judge's ruling, was not presented with a complete evidentiary picture which could have al-
lowed it to make a determination that the medical malpractice rather than the automobile acci-
dent was the proximate cause of Mr. Moreno's death." Weiner, 271 So. 2d at 219. This offers no
support for the conclusion that in legal malpractice actions courts often combine a "but for"
requirement with a high standard of proof. The reference in the Note to the fact that two surgical
packs had been left in the patient's body, while factually accurate, is not relevant on the question
of standard of proof.
It is also contended that Weiner "is particularly disturbing because it purports to follow Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. Price, [231 F. 397 (4th Cir. 1916)], a case that enunciates a simple 'but for'
test." Note, supra note 99, at 670. This is followed by the assertion that "[s]ince a majority of
jurisdictions look to Maryland Casualty for the standard of causation in legal malpractice, cases
that read its rule to require virtual certainty may influence other jurisdictions also to attach a
demanding standard of proof to the 'but for' test." Note, supra note 99, at 670. But Maryland
Casualty, as quoted in Weiner, simply requires that in an action against an attorney for negligence,
the plaintiff must prove "'that such negligence resulted in and was the proximate cause of loss to
the client.'" Weiner, 271 So. 2d at 219 (quoting Maryland Casualty, 231 F. at 401). This can be
interpreted as requiring virtual certainty only if a statement that proximate cause is required is
interpreted to mean that virtual certainty is required. This is an unacceptable conclusion.
Furthermore, an examination of the opinion in Maryland Casualty reveals that the court sim-
ply affirmed the trial court's sustaining of defendant's demurrer to an amended declaration be-
cause, as the opinion observes, the declaration does not allege that there was a meritorious defense
to an underlying action, and also affirmed the refusal of the trial court to allow further amend-
ment of the declaration on the additional ground that if this were permitted, the result could be
that the threshold amount required for jurisdiction would not be reached. This also provides no
basis for reading the case as requiring a standard of proof of virtual certainty.
102. 158 N.J. Super. 158, 385 A.2d 913 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
103. Id. at 166, 385 A.2d at 917 (emphasis in original).
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cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from
liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the
harm."4
Hoppe's assertion that the attorney's negligence need not be the proxi-
mate cause, but that it is enough that it be a proximate cause, is no more
than an application of traditional tort doctrine in legal malpractice actions.
Traditional tort doctrine provides for joint and several liability among joint
tortfeasors and has, as its basis, the principle that sole proximate cause is
generally not a requirement.l"' Thus, on this limited point, Hoppe appears
to add no novel approach in legal malpractice.
The independent intervening agency concept may be important in legal
malpractice actions, particularly with reference to the conduct of an attor-
ney who subsequently represented the client in matters for which the alleg-
edly negligent or otherwise defaulting attorney is being sued. While an
intervening cause may be superseding,"0 6 "[t]he connection between a negli-
gent act and an injury is not broken by an intervening event which occurs
so naturally in the course of events that it might reasonably have been antic-
ipated by the wrongdoer."' 0 7
B. Burden of Proof - The Mistake of "Routine" Application as
Affecting Fundamental Fairness
Traditional doctrines of burden of proof are "routinely" applied in legal
malpractice actions, even where there is a "trial within a trial," ' and it is
at this point that one may ask whether this constitutes impeccable correct-
ness, or an evasion of responsibility rising to the level of unconscionability
by the legal profession. The following discussion is intended, among other
things, to shed light on this question.
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431(a)(b) (1965).
105. See, eg., Johnson v. Chapman, 43 W. Va. 639, 645, 28 S.E. 744, 746 (1897) (in determin-
ing fault in a non-legal malpractice case, the court states, "both contributing thereto, both are
liable for the whole damage done, and cannot complain because they are both brought before the
court in the same suit").
106. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965) ("A superseding cause is an act of
a third person or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for
harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about.").
107. Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wash. 2d 581, 584, 328 P.2d 164, 166 (1958) (a legal malpractice
action not involving a "suit within a suit"). The court also states, "[w]e see no sound reason, and
none is urged why the degree of causation which must be proved in an action for damages for
malpractice should be any different from that required in an ordinary negligence case." Id.
108. Williams v. Bashman, 457 F. Supp. 322, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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If the malpractice charged is related to the prosecution of an underlying
action, it is generally held that where there is a "trial within a trial" the
client-plaintiff in the legal malpractice action has the burden of proof109 to
establish that proper handling of the matter would have resulted in recov-
ery of a judgment," 0 and that the judgment would have been fully or par-
tially collectible. within a period of time established by a jurisdictional
rule.' 12 Where the alleged malpractice of an attorney relates to defending
an action, it is frequently stated that where there is a "trial within a trial"
the client-plaintiff in the legal malpractice action has the burden of proof to
establish that if not for the negligence or other improper conduct com-
plained of, the action would have been successfully defended, 1 3 or the cli-
ent would have achieved a better result. 14
Is it fair and proper for courts to place the burden of proof upon the
client, as described above, where there is a "trial within a trial?" It may be
urged that there is a sound basis for this requirement historically and in
contemporary legal development, as a "trial within a trial" is simply a
unique method of establishing causation, and placing the burden of proof
upon a plaintiff to prove all of the essential allegations of an action, includ-
ing causation, is accepted legal doctrine. 15 But does it follow that in cases
involving a "case within a case," and therefore a "trial within a trial," it is
proper to apply such accepted legal doctrine?
It is submitted that the answer is in the negative, and that placing the
burden of proof upon client-plaintiff in these instances constitutes an eva-
sion by the legal profession of its responsibility to its clients. A "trial within
a trial" in a legal malpractice action is unique in that, unlike in other ac-
tions, it must be established that the client-plaintiff would have succeeded in
109. Id. (client-plaintiff "must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she
would have recovered a judgment in the underlying action").
110. Id. But see Nitis v. Goldenthal, 128 A.D.2d 687, 688, 513 N.Y.S.2d 186, 188 (App. Div.
1987) (the court, while stating that "[tihe plaintiff in a legal malpractice action must show that but
for his attorney's negligence, he would have prevailed on the underlying claim," nevertheless con-
cludes that "an attorney who asserts that an affirmative defense exists which would defeat the
underlying claim bears the burden of proof on that issue").
111. See supra Section II B.
112. See supra Section II B 2.
113. Zych, 84 Ill. App. 3d at 652, 406 N.E.2d at 75; Gillespie v. Klun, 406 N.W.2d 547, 555
(Minn. App. 1987); Sherry, 29 Wash. App. 433, 628 P.2d 1336.
114. Sherry, 29 Wash. App. at 438, 628 P.2d at 1338.
115. See Lindemann v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., 5 Cal. 2d 480, 508, 55 P.2d 870, 884
(1936) ("Besides, the jury was instructed that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to prove
every essential element of the [personal injury] case by a preponderance of evidence..."); Janow
v. Town of Ansonia, 11 Conn. App. 1, 8, 525 A.2d 966, 969 (1987) ("The plaintiff, however, is still
bound to prove the essential allegations of his [personal injury] complaint.").
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an action or defense at an earlier point in time against one who is not a
party to the legal malpractice action. Therefore, "routinely" bringing to
bear accepted legal doctrine in this context is principled only if its applica-
tion is affirmatively justified. But fundamental fairness weighs heavily
against placing the burden of proof upon the client-plaintiff to prove causa-
tion in a "trial within a trial."
The "trial within a trial" requires proof that a judgment would have
been obtained against one who is not a party to the legal malpractice ac-
tion,"' or proof that there would have been a successful, or more success-
ful, defense against one who is not a party to the legal malpractice action. 17
Difficulties in proof, varied and significant, exist at the "trial within a trial,"
which would not have confronted the client if the underlying action had in
fact been litigated."1 The client may be required at the "trial within a
trial" to produce witnesses who are no longer available, and evidence that is
old and has become difficult or impossible to obtain. 9 As legal malprac-
tice actions are very frequently grounded upon an attorney's failure to com-
mence an underlying action within the time prescribed by the statute of
limitations,12 or failure to answer within a prescribed time,121 difficulties
such as these are significant probabilities. The delay necessitating the pro-
duction of proof that has become more difficult to obtain because of the
passage of time was caused by the negligence or other improper conduct of
the attorney. Is the attorney to benefit and the client to be prejudiced by
the wrong committed by the attorney? The answer today is "yes," but it
must become "no" if the legal profession is to meet its obligation to apply to
its clients fair and ethical principles of law.
The author has found that case law generally does not recognize that
this problem exists and it fails to acknowledge that accepted principles ap-
plicable in other areas should not be applied here. The barreness of
thought, concern and analysis that is inherent in courts applying traditional
116. Williams, 457 F. Supp. at 326.
117. Sherry, 29 Wash. App. at 438, 628 P.2d at 1338.
118. See, e.g., Gautam v. DeLuca, 215 N.J. Super. 388, 398, 521 A.2d 1343, 1348 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1987).
119. Id.
120. See, eg., McDow v. Dixon, 138 Ga. App. 338, 226 S.E.2d 145 (1976); Baker v. Beal, 225
N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 1975); Christy, 288 Minn. 144, 179 N.W.2d 288; Hoppe, 158 N.J. Super. 158,
385 A.2d 913; Ferencz v. Milie, 519 Pa. 141, 535 A.2d 59 (1987); Duke & Co. v. Anderson, 275
Pa. Super. 65, 418 A.2d 613 (1980); see also Koffler, supra note 6.
121. See, e.g., Giuffria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 293 So. 2d 518 (La. Ct. App. 1974);
Anderson v. Griffin, Dysart, Taylor, Penner & Lay, P.C., 684 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984);
R.H. Schwartz Constr. Specialties, Inc. v. Hanrahan, 207 Mont. 105, 672 P.2d 1116 (1983); Mas-




doctrines of burden of proof in a "trial within a trial" is gleaned from the
opinion of the Washington Court of Appeals in Sherry v. Diercks.'22 In
Sherry, the court states:
The client argues, in effect, that once he showed that the attorney
did not defend the client, the burden of proof should shift to the
attorney to justify the entry of the default judgment. That is not the
law of this state. We are not persuaded that there is any logical
justification to vary the foregoing well established principles of prox-
imate causation and burden of proof in such cases. 123
There has been a trickle of cases that are not in accord with the general
view, including an 1831 English case" 4 in which the defendant attorney,
who had allowed a default judgment to be entered against the client, urged
that "no action lies for negligence unless the Plaintiff shew special dam-
age."' 25 Alderson, J., in his opinion, arrives directly at the conclusion that
"[n]egligence, therefore, has been proved against [the attorney] and he has
failed to shew that it was immaterial to the Plaintiff [client]," 126 and as a
result the attorney is liable.
In Glidden v. Terranova,12 7 where the attorney allowed a default to be
entered against the client in the underlying action, the court acknowledges
that "[w]here a party who was the plaintiff in a legal action sues his attor-
ney for negligence in the prosecution of that action, he must establish that
he probably would have succeeded in the underlying litigation were it not
for the attorney's negligence.""12 But the court adds that there are no ap-
pellate cases in Massachusetts which answer the question of where the bur-
den of proof lies in a malpractice action when the defendant-attorney
allegedly failed to defend in the underlying litigation. Glidden holds that
the attorney should bear the burden of proof in such a case, "'since the
client had no obligation "to prove his case" in the underlying action (he
could have simply required the plaintiff to prove his case), he should not
shoulder the burden of proving a defense in the malpractice action.' "29
122. 29 Wash. App. 433, 628 P.2d 1336 (1981).
123. Id. at 438, 628 P.2d at 1339.
124. Godefroy v. Jay, 131 Eng. Rep. 159 (1831).
125. Id. at 161.
126. Id. at 163.
127. 427 N.E.2d 1169 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
128. Id. at 1171.
129. Id. (quoting NOLAN, TORT LAW § 182). The distinction drawn in Glidden leads one to
question whether courts, which frequently state that the burden of proof is upon the client to
establish that there was a meritorious defense to the underlying action, are thinking in terms of
requiring that the client establish that an adequate affirmative defense existed to the underlying
action, or are thinking in terms of requiring that the client establish either that the plaintiff in the
underlying action would have been unable to prove his case, or in the alternative that the client
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The Louisiana Supreme Court in Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine In-
surance Co. 130 applies a reasoned approach in rejecting the general rule that
the client has the burden of proof to establish that he or she would have
prevailed upon a claim in the underlying action. This is a case grounded
upon the fact that the attorney had failed to timely file his client's claim in
the underlying action. The court states, in the first step of a two-step analy-
sis, that once the client "has proved that his former attorney accepted em-
ployment and failed to assert the claim timely, then the client has
established a prima facie case that the attorney's negligence caused him
some loss, since it is unlikely the attorney would have agreed to handle a
claim completely devoid of merit."' 131
Although the court does not elaborate upon this reasoning, the author
suggests that an effort can be made to justify the hypothesis that it is un-
likely that the attorney would have agreed to handle a claim completely
devoid of merit, by reference to the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility. The Model Code provides that in the representation of a client, a
lawyer shall not "[fjile a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a
trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it
is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously
injure another;"13 2 and shall not "[k]nowingly advance a claim or defense
that is unwarranted under existing law, except that he may advance such
claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an exten-
sion, modification, or reversal of existing law.",
133
But query whether all attorneys comply with these provisions of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility? Yet, even if they do not,
should it not for this purpose be presumed that they do comply, or where
would have prevailed upon an affirmative defense. In Garguilo, 58 A.D.2d 683, 395 N.Y.S.2d 751,
the court points out, in affirming, that the trial court dismissed the action on the ground that the
client failed to make "a showing that a meritorious defense was available" in the underlying action.
Id. at 683, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 752 (emphasis added). The court then states that "in an action against
an attorney for alleged malpractice, the [client] must show not only that the [attorney] was negli-
gent, but also that the [client] would have been successful in the underlying action." Id. at 683-84,
395 N.Y.S.2d at 752 (emphasis added). Thus it appears that the court may be confused, or at
least projects confusion, as to what it is requiring or permitting the client to prove in order to
prevail in a legal malpractice action. See also Grayson v. Wilkinson, 7 Miss. (5 S. & M. 268)
(1845); Giuffria, 293 So. 2d at 519.
130. 422 So. 2d 1109 (1982).
131. Id. at 1110.
132. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1989).
133. Id. at DR 7-102(A)(2) (1989); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT
Rule 3.1 (1983) ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue
therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.").
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the Code is not enacted in a jurisdiction, that they adhere to comparable
standards? Furthermore, the court's reasoning is based upon what is
"likely," and therefore lack of universality is consistent with the hypothesis
upon which the court bases its conclusion that a prima facie case is
established.
The Jenkins court then takes the second step in its analysis and con-
cludes that having, in its view, established a "prima facie case" that the
attorney's negligence caused the client some loss, the "more logical ap-
proach"1 34 is to impose on the negligent attorney, at this point in the trial,
"the burden of going forward with the evidence to overcome the client's
prima facie case by proving that the client could not have succeeded on the
original claim."' 135 The court persuasively supports this conclusion by ob-
serving that "[t]he client's problem is frequently compounded when the at-
torney's negligence and the lapse of time has left a new attorney to search
for stale evidence and has prevented or severely hampered thorough and
effective preparation of the claim for trial." 136
The inadequacy of the reasoning in Jenkins lies in the fact that the first
step of the court's two-step analysis, that of raising a "prima facie" case, is
artificially constructed and has a basis that is of questionable factual valid-
ity. Therefore, it may be expected that courts in other jurisdictions will
refuse to take this step. Furthermore, the second step, and the court's con-
clusion, are based upon what the court finds logically follows from the hy-
pothesis constructed and conclusion reached in the first step, rather than
upon a recognition of unconscionability. 137
134. Jenkins, 422 So. 2d at 1110.
135. Id.
136. Id. at n.2.
137. See also Cook v. Gould, 109 Ill. App. 3d 311, 314, 440 N.E.2d 448, 450 (1982). In Cook,
an attorney allowed the statute of limitations to run in the underlying action. The court refused to
reject existing Illinois law which provided that the client has the burden of proving that his claim
would have been successful had it not been for the negligence of the attorney. But in unusual
dictum the court states that "[n]otwithstanding the state of the law, however, we can conceive of
situations where the attorney, because of equitable considerations, might be estopped to deny the
validity of the underlying lawsuit." Id. at 314, 440 N.E.2d at 450. Such estoppel, the court adds,
"would give rise to a shifting burden of proof that would require the lawyer, in the first instance,
to present some evidence as to the lack of value of the underlying action. The instant action,
however, is not such a case." Id.
This dictum in Cook is inadequate for several reasons. Although the attorney would be re-
quired in the first instance to present "some evidence" to shift the burden of proof to the client,
the amount of evidence is not further quantified. It appears that what is contemplated as adequate
to shift the burden of proof to the client is considerably less than a preponderance of the evidence.
Therefore, this view, if implemented, would be inadequate as an instrument for arriving at justice
in this area. Additionally, estoppel could be invoked only in those cases where a special showing
is made. This would restrict even this limited variance from the general rule to individual or
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The author recommends that the general rule be rejected by the courts
on the basis of a direct and unencumbered recognition that this rule, a crea-
ture of the legal profession, is unconscionable towards the clients that the
legal profession is bound, in a fiduciary relationship, to assist and protect.
The legal profession cannot conscionably support the continued application
of a rule that allows an attorney to negligently represent a client and
thereby cause a lapse of time and change in circumstances that makes the
client's claim or defense more difficult to prove,138 and then place upon the
client the burden to prove the very claim or defense that the attorney's
negligence has made more difficult to prove. The unconscionability of the
present approach of placing the burden of proof upon the client-plaintiff in
the legal malpractice action must be recognized and accepted by the courts
as a rationale for refusing to apply traditional doctrines of burden of proof
in these cases.
On the different, but related question of an attorney negligently failing
to file an appeal, courts generally have placed the burden upon the client to
prove that the appeal would have been successful. 139 But the United States
District Court for Eastern Louisiana in Cabot, Cabot & Forbes v. Brian,
Simon, Peragine, Smith & Redfearn,' 4 indicating that it is following "the
mandate of Jenkins,"14 ' concludes to the contrary that the attorney "must
carry the burden of showing that [the client's] appeal would not have suc-
ceeded." ' a The court goes on to state, after finding that the Louisiana ap-
pellate court would have reversed and remanded the case to the trial court,
that the attorney also has the burden of establishing that at trial the client
would not have achieved a better result.' 43
isolated cases. The Cook court fails to perceive that the general rule is unconscionable and oper-
ates unfairly in all cases.
138. But see Coggin, "Attorney Negligence... A Suit Within a Suit," 60 W. VA. L. REV. 225,
235 (1958) ("A more valid objection to the use of the suit within a suit method of ascertaining
damages is the fact that the attorney defendant will probably not have at his disposal the evidence
which would have been offered by the opposing party in the original action.").
139. See, e.g., Molever v. Roush, 152 Ariz. 367, 732 P.2d 1105 (1986); Gillion v. Tieman, 86
Ill. App. 3d 147, 407 N.E.2d 1146 (1980); Dings v. Callahan, 4 Kan. App. 2d 36, 602 P.2d 542
(Ct. App. 1979); Daugert, 104 Wash. 2d 254, 704 P.2d 600 (1985).
140. 568 F. Supp. 371 (1983).
141. Id. at 373.
142. Id. at 373-74.
143. Id. at 376.
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C. Burden of Proof - Proffered Solutions1"
The author recommends that where there is a "trial within a trial" in a
legal malpractice action, and the client was or would have been the plaintiff
in the underlying action, the attorney should have the burden of proving
that the client would not have recovered a judgment in the underlying ac-
tion.145 Since the delay which engendered the difficulty of proof is of the
attorney's making, it is fair and sound, and in the view of the author imper-
ative, that the difficulties in proof be the attorney's and not the client's bur-
den. If the attorney fails to establish that the client would not have
recovered a judgment in the underlying action, the client should have the
burden of proving the amount of the judgment that would have been recov-
ered. Even if the attorney establishes that the client would not have recov-
ered a judgment in the underlying action, the client should be permitted to
establish that if not for the negligence or other improper conduct of the
attorney, the underlying action would have been settled, as for example, in
a factual context where the attorney failed to advise the client of an offer to
settle. The client should have the burden of proving that the underlying
action would have been settled, and also the amount of such a settlement.
In these instances it is necessary to marshal evidence to affirmatively estab-
lish ultimate facts - the amount of a judgment, or the fact and amount of a
settlement - and therefore, the burden of proof should properly rest with
the client.
Where the issue is whether the underlying action would have been suc-
cessfully defended or more successfully defended, if not for the attorney's
negligence or other improper conduct, the burden of proof should be upon
the attorney to prove that even if he or she had acted properly, there would
have been no successful defense, or no more successful defense, of the un-
144. Wherever, in the recommendations proffered in this section, the author refers to burden
of proof, the recommendation is that the burden be by a preponderance of the evidence.
145. But see Note, supra note 99, where a different standard is proposed based upon analogy
to a "lost substantial possibility of survival" standard in medical malpractice. Id. at 679. This
proposed standard would require plaintiff in a legal malpractice action to prove a "lost substantial
possibility of recovery," and upon this showing "the factfinder may infer causation." Id. at 679-
80. In support of this standard it is reasoned that "[a]lthough the plaintiff must still provide
evidence of the merits of the underlying claim, the requirement of showing certainty, often pre-
cluded by the attorney's prior behavior, no longer exists." Id. at 680. This reasoning is not ac-
ceptable because it assumes that there presently exists a requirement of showing certainty, but as
is demonstrated in the analysis in supra note 101, this has not been established.
On the merits of the proposal, perhaps a "lost substantial possibility of recovery" is too vague
a standard, but more important, the proposal should be rejected on the ground that it continues to
require the client to bear the burden of proof. It is unconscionable to require that the client,
rather than the attorney, bear the burden of proof, for reasons set out in the text. See supra text
accompanying notes 138-50.
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derlying action. Here, too, the delay which engenders added difficulty in
proof is of the attorney's making, and it is unconscionable to prejudice the
client because of the attorney's negligence or other improper conduct. If
the attorney fails to establish that there would have been no successful de-
fense to the underlying action, the attorney should be permitted to show
that a judgment in some amount would have been recovered against the
client in the underlying action. The attorney should have the burden of
proof on this issue, and also the burden of proof to establish the amount of
such a judgment. If the client desires to establish that the action would
have been settled if not for the attorney's negligence or other improper con-
duct, the client should be permitted to do so, and should have the burden of
proof on this issue and also on establishing the amount of such a settlement.
These recommended changes are of immediate urgency in legal mal-
practice actions, as they have at their core the attorney-client relationship.
The attorney-client relationship is fiduciary in nature 146 and requires the
ultimate in trust. It cannot legitimately provide the attorney with a vehicle
for damaging the client by negligence or other improper conduct, and then
allow the attorney to use the results of this conduct to prejudice the client
procedurally and substantively to the point where the client may be effec-
tively deprived of redress against the attorney. To allow the present situa-
tion to continue would be to perpetuate both an unconscionable and
unethical framework for justice in this area.
It is also generally held that where the client-plaintiff in a legal malprac-
tice action was or would have been the plaintiff in the underlying action, he
or she bears the burden of proof on the issue of collectibility of a judgment
that would have been recovered in the underlying action if not for the negli-
gence or other improper conduct of the attorney. 147 In an unusual holding,
however, the court in Hoppe v. Ranzini 148 states that "fairness requires that
the burden of proof with respect to the issue of collectibility should be upon
the attorney defendants, notwithstanding the rule elsewhere that places that
burden on plaintiff."' 149
146. See Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 188, 491 P.2d 421,
428-29, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 844-45 (1971).
147. See, e.g., Sitton, 257 F. Supp. at 67; McDow, 138 Ga. App. at 338, 226 S.E.2d at 147
(1976); Pickens, Barnes & Abernathy v. Heasley, 328 N.W.2d 524, 526 (Iowa 1983) (if prior
defendant's solvency is not known beyond question, "the client must introduce substantial evi-
dence from which a jury could reasonably find that a prior judgment would have been collectible
in full, or could reasonably find the portion of the judgment which would have been collectible");
Taylor Oil Co. v. Weisensee, 334 N.W.2d 27, 29 n.2 (S.D. 1983).
148. 158 N.J. Super. 158, 385 A.2d 913 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
149. Id. at 171, 385 A.2d at 920. At least one additional state court has rejected the general
rule that the burden of proof is on the client-plaintiff in a legal malpractice action to prove collec-
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The author recommends that the burden of proof be placed upon the
attorney to prove that the judgment would not have been collectible, in
whole or in part, during the relevant statute of limitations period for enforc-
ing a judgment. 150 It is fair and proper to require the attorney to bear this
burden of proof, as the issue of collectibility would not have existed if not
for the negligence or other improper conduct of the attorney. If this is not
done, the client will continue to be unfairly prejudiced in his or her ability
to obtain redress for damages caused by the attorney's wrongful conduct.
Whether or not a judgment would have been collectible, especially at a dis-
tant point in time, is frequently difficult to prove. This difficulty should be
the attorney's - not the client's. The fiduciary nature of the attorney-client
relationship makes imperative the formulation of principles whereby the
wrong of the attorney can be redressed without unfair burdens being placed
upon the client. The legal profession must not continue to apply principles
relating to the burden of proof on the issue of collectibility that are funda-
mentally unfair to its clients.
Fundamental fairness also requires that where the attorney negligently
fails to file or perfect an appeal, the burden of proof be placed upon the
attorney to establish that the appeal would have been unsuccessful. The
general view currently followed by the courts, which places the burden of
proof upon the client to establish that the appeal would have been success-
ful, burdens the client and rewards the attorney for his or her negligence. If
the attorney fails to establish that the appeal would have been unsuccessful
and the court in the legal malpractice action concludes that the appellate
court would not have entered judgment for the client, but would have re-
versed and remanded the case to the trial court, then consistent with the
recommendations set out above, the attorney should also have the burden
of proof in a "trial within a trial" to establish that the client, if the claimant
in the underlying action, would not have prevailed in that action, or that
the client, if the defendant in the underlying action, would not have de-
tibility. Jourdain v. Dineen, 527 A.2d 1304, 1306 (Me. 1987). The Jourdain court adopted the
rule that "uncollectibility is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved by the defend-
ant." Id. at 1306. Another variation on the issue of burden of proof in this context is set forth by
a federal court applying New York law. In Wagner v. Tucker, 517 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
the court states:
It is thus reasonable to conclude that while a New York court might place the burden of
proof upon the plaintiff to demonstrate the collectibility of any judgment received in the
underlying action, it will also place a burden of going forward on the defendant such that,
if the issue is not raised by the defendant, no proof of collectibility is required of the
plaintiff.
Id. at 1252.
150. For a discussion of collectibility, see supra Section II B.
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feated that action or achieved a better result. If the client desires to estab-
lish that the action would have been settled if not for the attorney's
negligence or other improper conduct, the client should be permitted to do
so, and should have the burden of proof on this issue and also on establish-
ing the amount of such a settlement.
V. CONCLUSION
Intricacies and special consequences result from the unique nature of a
"trial within a trial" in a legal malpractice action. Among the numerous
matters considered in this Article relating to a "trial within a trial" have
been questions of burden of proof. For reasons that may involve simply
slipshod analysis, or more, principles of law relating to burden of proof in a
"trial within a trial" have generally been skewed enormously in favor of the
attorney and against the client. For example, where the statute of limita-
tions has run on a claim that the attorney wrongfully failed to institute, the
attorney is generally not required to bear the burden of proving that the
claim was invalid. Rather, the client is generally required to bear the bur-
den of proving that had the attorney properly commenced the action, the
client would have prevailed. Frequently several years have elapsed and evi-
dence needed to establish the claim has been lost or diluted by the passage
of time - the very passage of time caused by the attorney's wrongful con-
duct. The result is that the attorney derives a benefit from his or her wrong-
ful conduct, and thus the system of justice places, wittingly or otherwise, an
unconscionable burden upon the client. As a consequence, legal doctrine in
this area surreptitiously mocks the fiduciary relationship of the attorney to
the client. Recommendations have been offered by the author to overcome
the unconscionable nature of the status quo. These recommendations, if
implemented, should result in a system of justice in this area that for the
first time meets the test of fundamental fairness to the client.
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